A biological approach to behaviour is inherent in the development of modern science, and mechanistic explanations of reflexes, for example, were already given by Descartes in his Discourse on Method (1637), foreboding the developments of neurophysiology. A systematic evolutionary approach to human behaviour was attempted by Darwin himself, and his study on facial muscular expressions in humans and animals of such feelings as suffering, anxiety, grief, despair, joy, hatred and anger (The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 1872), irrespective of the authenticity of his pictures on which doubt has been cast, laid the groundwork for the contemporary developments of human ethology and psychobiology. Similar attempts are widely disseminated on the path of human and life sciences. Yet, however obvious such an approach may appear to a biological mind, that was far from widely accepted for a long time.
pathways in the development of a phenotype. Indeed, as behaviour genetic research has repeatedly shown in recent years, however similar treatments siblings may receive, they are frequently found to respond differently to environmental opportunities or challenges, partly on account of genetic differences in abilities, preferences, liabilities and so on (e.g. Plomin & Daniels, 1987) . These views and findings are still frequently disregarded or rejected uncritically, largely because of the subtle yet persistent sociocultural bias, whereby one wants to see human nature as essentially dependent on society and education, and any biological explanation is viewed as a disturbance, particularly when the notion of diversity is understood in terms of social inequality rather than of biological variability.
These and related themes are extensively dealt with in this Festschrift volume honouring Daniel Freedman's pioneering efforts to explore human behaviour using an evolutionary approach and pointing to the interaction of the biological and environmental variables that shape human nature. This is epitomized by the book's title, Uniting Psychology and Biology. The volume is organized in eight content sections generated by the four areas to which Freedman contributed: behaviour genetics, human ethology, evolutionary psychology and cultural anthropology.
Section I sets the stage for the reader to appreciate Freedman's role and personality and introduces, with an essay by J. M. Bailey, a number of critical issues. These include: (a) the integration of the evolutionary perspective, focused on selection, hence on the expectation of uniformity of behaviour within groups, with the empirical data of behaviour genetics which is focused on variability, hence on the expectation of individual differences; (b) the notion of heritability and the poorly understood fact that, however relatively high heritability is found to be (as in fact is true for the most diverse variables examined so far), it does not at all imply any straightforward genotype-to-phenotype pathway; and (c) the role of genetic covariation in phenotypic correlations commonly attributed to social factors.
Section II examines the genetic bases of behaviour, with essays on aggression (I. I. Gottesman et al.) , social behaviour (J. P. Scott) and twin research (N. L. Segal). Examining aggression, and more generally, behaviour both normal and disordered, in a developmental and genetic perspective, Gottesman et al. again stress the general concept that although genetic influences are much stronger than social scientists are ready to admit, genes have only a probabilistic effect on the development of behaviour, depending on the diversity of developmental routes, involving interactions, thresholds and biopsychosocial contingencies.
Sections III and IV are devoted to biological approaches to developmental issues, and to naturalistic studies of behaviour, with essays on child-parent attachment (R. S. Marvin), sexual orientation (R. C. Savin-Williams & L. M. Diamond), genotype-phenotype relation in complex conditions such as alcohol flushing, blushing and dyslexia (P. H. Wolff), and on cross-cultural perspectives in the expression of emotion (P. Ekman), mother-infant interaction (R. A. LeVine) and marriage (C. C. Weisfeld). Section V applies the perspective of evolutionary psychology to the analysis of some of the most complex aspects of human nature, largely related to the area of emotion. Intrapsychic conflict is here seen in the light of genomic imprinting and the possible opposition or differential activation of paternal and maternal genes (R. L. Trivers). Basic emotions are examined with special reference to pride-shame, as the species-wide building blocks of behaviour and the very sources of happiness and unhappiness (G. E. Weisfeld). Happiness is found to be unrealistic as a state and episodic at best, even in an evolutionary perspective (J. H. Barkow), with an analysis of the adaptive value of pleasure (the seven 'deadly sins') leading to echo the view of Eastern spirituality that considers desire as the very root of unhappiness.
Section VI is devoted to six films Freedman authored to document his studies, particularly those on constitutional and environmental interactions in rearing four breeds of dogs (with a commentary by J. P. Scott) and on the development of the smile and fear of strangers (with a commentary by L. P. Lipsitt). Section VII examines novel conceptualizations and future perspectives at the juncture of behaviour genetics, human ethology, evolutionary psychology and culture, with studies on genetic influences on marital status (S. L. Trumbetta & I. I. Gottesman), on mating systems in an ethological perspective (W. M. Schleidt) and on family violence (R. J. Levesque). Section VIII offers a final overview by the editors.
Although the sections vary in scope and extensiveness, and the numerous contributions offer a multiplicity of approaches and perspectives, the book is generally well organized, and the introductory and concluding remarks for each section contribute to convey a sense of cohesion. That is not simply formal, since the substance of all contributions is to stress the relevance, and the possibility, of bringing together psychology and biology in the context of natural history and the evolution of living organisms, which is in fact where all behaviour, or for that reason mental phenomena, originate. Overall, this is an important book, a must for anyone interested in human biology and behaviour, and the editors are to be congratulated for putting it together and contributing to such a worthy effort.
Interestingly, in the introductory section and elsewhere in the volume, Freedman presents his unifying vision as rooted in the metaphysical notion of non-duality, characteristic of Eastern spirituality (as well as forms of Western mysticism), and specifically of the Vedanta tradition. That is refreshing. When science and spirituality are related, a standard approach is to look for scientific evidence supporting notions of spiritual or metaphysical nature, which may be a legitimate procedure in a scientific perspective but is illogical in that of spirituality. In this context, whatever is scientifically explainable falls into the realm of phenomena, and says little if anything about causal planes of reality that only allow non-analytic, metalogical approaches. Freedman appears to be aware of this and does not attempt to scrutinize the non-dual perspective of metaphysics, but merely adopts it as a guideline to look scientifically into phenomena in search of unifying interpretations in a holistic frame of reference. Perhaps he is just somewhat too much after the big picture, and oversimplifications slip in. His portrait of his three mentors, particularly Maslow and Bateson (the third being Goldstein), is instructive and shows aspects of their personalities that some may find to differ from what they expected, but still gives the impression of some amount of idealization. His suggestion that Maslow's illness 'may have been his ''dark night of the soul'' insofar as it preceded the enormously productive period that followed' [p. 20] marks a confusion between what is considered to be one of the highest stages in a spiritual path, a mystical experience in which the soul is said to suffer in total isolation, and what is instead a simple state of enhanced creativity, when one may feel, as Maslow is described to have been, 'fully energized and bursting with ideas'. Similarly, Freedman's referring to enlightenment and celibacy as a singular process (p. 518) is misleading, and he seems to mix up the ultimate achievement of a spiritual path with one of its stages and instruments. These and other such instances convey the impression of an approach that is at times somewhat closer to the New Age mood than to the rigorous epistemology of the Vedanta path or other expressions of the spiritual tradition. Be as it may, Freedman's contribution is of great value, and to some extent unique, in that it combines scientific progress in various areas with a more general openness on the ultimate nature of humanity and reality.
P France is the paradigm case of the demographic transition: a phenomenon of relatively rapid decline from high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low mortality. France was one of the first countries, if not the first, to undergo this cultural change, and it is also a country where parish records document the change in detail; thus fertility decline in France has been the subject of much study by historical demographers.
There are two main problems with paradigm cases. First, there is often a tendency to assume that all other cases will resemble them more closely than they in fact do. Second, if findings are revised in subsequent studies, the paradigm itelf is thrown into crisis. In the case of the demographic transition, the first problem has already arisen: no two transitions are identical and demographers are despairing of ever finding a single correlate of the onset of fertility decline, such that doubt is being cast on the usefulness of 'the demographic transition' as a unitary concept. And Bonneuil's book brings forward the second problem; it helps to challenge some of the received wisdom about the demographic transition in France. The challenges are not necessarily fundamental or momentous, and the author himself apologizes for parts of the book being rather dry. But it does illustrate the value of careful scrutiny of data in the study of past populations.
Bonneuil fears that previous studies have not taken account of biases in the recorded data, mainly arising from under-reporting from urban areas (where mortality and fertility were higher than in the countryside in this period) and the under-registration of births (which declined through the century). When corrections are made for these biases, it then appears that the true decline in fertility may not have been as early as some have reported, perhaps not preceding that in England reported by such sources as Wrigley & Schofield (1981) . He also doubts that there was an acceleration of fertility just prior to the decline, as had become accepted wisdom. But the point that this book really emphasizes is how data have to be examined not as isolated points in history but trends in both space and time. The clumping of data from different areas masks what is happening, and can provide quite a misleading perspective. Bonneuil paints a picture of different areas progressing into fertility decline at different times, with the isolated areas being the last to change. He fails to find any obvious correlates of the onset of decline, and favours the notion that it is an idea, a cultural innovation, that is spreading around France, starting in the centres of sophistication and finally progressing to remote areas; this is a view also favoured by other social scientists (e.g. Carlsson, 1969) .
Of course, one problem with this view, as Bonneuil appreciates, is that it is never possible to prove that a change is not adaptive: maybe we have not measured the right thing, or incorporated the correct time-lag? Maybe time-lags are different in different areas? He talks a great deal about the evolution of fertility and mortality -a word he uses in the general sense of change through time; but this is all of relevance to those of us interested in the evolution of demographic transitions in the Darwinian sense. It is a fascinating question, why we deliberately limit our fertility when our psychology presumably evolved to maximize our reproductive success. Some of the trends that are puzzling to human evolutionary ecologists and economists, such as the likelihood that wealthy families will reduce fertility prior to poorer ones in apparently unified populations, are also challenged if populations that were considered as unitary, are in fact considered as conglomerates of different strata. Correlations within each stratum may be in an entirely different direction from those observed when data are lumped, and breaking the population down into sub-units in space and time can generate patterns closer to those predicted by adaptive models (Mace, 1998 ). An idea may indeed have been spreading around France, and this idea might have been successful because it is based on cues that influence our levels of paternal investment in each child that either are adaptive now or were adaptive in past environments.
There is no doubt that a demographic transition to low fertility is one of the most fundamental changes that can occur to a human population, thus being a major phenomenon in the history of Europe over the last two centuries, and of contemporary life in the developing world in this century and probably the next -but books such as this one remind us that we still don't really understand what is happening.
